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A great deal of international effort has been devoted to the issue of women‟s 
rights. This has culminated in a growing number of legal declarations and 
conventions in which States have pledged their sincerity to addressing and opposing 
incidents of violence against women; it has also resulted in significant developments 
amongst non-governmental organisations, focused on alleviating the plight of women 
internationally, and ensuring the protection of women‟s human rights. There has 
been extensive research dedicated to understanding the causes and effects of 
gendered violence, such as rape, genocide, and trafficking, and a plethora of 
evidence has been amassed with respect to outlining, supporting, proving and 
chronicling violence committed against women‟s bodies and minds. Indeed, when it 
comes to acknowledging and confirming women‟s status as „victims‟ in violence, the 
international community faces no shortage of examples.  It is clear that women‟s role 
as victims in violence has become cemented in not only our perceptions, but also in 
international legal instruments, as well as judicial and State practice. However, this 
conception of women‟s eternal „victimisation‟ becomes extremely problematic in 
those situations where women are clearly not the victims of violence, but rather its 
perpetrators. It is during these incidents that the international community experiences 
great difficulty in reconciling its image of women as victims of violence with the 
realisation that women can be, and are, as capable of brutality as men. 
This article exposes the connection between social perception and 
international legal practice, and does so within the context of women‟s involvement in 
internationalised examples of political violence. By unravelling and examining the 
threads of testimonies, assumptions, and observations that interweave in our popular 
accounts of women‟s political violence, it is possible to assemble a more thorough 
picture of how violent women (and the havoc they sometimes instigate) are 
commonly perceived. In addition, and more remarkably, this assemblage of 
narratives - extracted from various academic, media and literary sources - illustrate 
the permanence and influence of these perceptions not only in how we conceptualise 
women‟s engagement in violent behaviour, but also how we legally and publicly 
manage and respond to such conduct.  
The current article is premised on a tripartite thesis. First, it argues that gender 
stereotypes that function as normalised aspects of society, the assumptions that are 
often described as “rooted in biology and confirmed in history”,1 shape the way we 
view and interpret women‟s participation in political violence. Second, it maintains 
that this gendering of violence (differentiating between the violence of men and that 
of women) results in explanations that portray women perpetrators as „victims‟, and 
describe their acts of brutality as apolitical, irregular, and lacking agency.  Third, this 
paper verifies how this theoretical conception of women as „victims in violence‟ 
affects the international responses to political violence in a manner that has 
tremendous implications for the human rights protection of various actors in global 
politics. 
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The ideas put forth and presented in this paper unequivocally demonstrate the 
association between social perception and legal practice, and confirm that the 
assumptions that the international community makes about women, about femininity, 
and about the primacy and naturalness of patriarchy, are very much entrenched 
within the legal framework that shapes and controls our lived realities. In so doing, 
the conclusions drawn in this essay cast suspicion on the neutrality of international 
law, and the limits of its capacity for addressing concerns in a manner that places 
women on equal footing to men. However, to balance the somewhat sombre 
landscape of the arguments, this paper also evaluates certain „victories‟ that law has 
achieved, some of which elicit a degree of optimism for the future management of 
political violence internationally. 
Selecting a slightly extended focus than previous literature on the subject, the 
current article tackles the gap between international theory and practice in four 
stages.  First, chapter two introduces the three conceptual models underpinning the 
central arguments: the concept of political violence, the idea of gender stereotypes 
and gender models, and the notion of victimhood.  
Second, chapter three and four examine the most common narratives about 
women‟s political violence to exhibit how widespread perceptions of women‟s 
brutality continue to be predicated on gender stereotypes and conventional gendered 
norms of conduct. These two sections undertake an analysis of two of the most 
explosive and appalling expressions of women‟s political violence - terrorism and 
genocide. The third chapter, on terrorism, analyses accounts about Palestinian 
women‟s involvement in suicide terror and the women members of the Rote Armee 
Fraktion (RAF). Similarly, the fourth chapter on genocidal violence, also includes two 
different case studies. This chapter explores the various narratives that materialise 
concerning the violence of two convicted genocidaires, Biljana Plavšić (Republika 
Srpska) and Pauline Nyiramasuhuko (Rwanda).   
Third, by drawing on the narratives presented in the preceding two chapters, 
chapter five examines what the „gendering‟ of violence means for our understanding 
of women‟s political violence. The primary argument is that by gendering violence we 
cast women as „victims‟ in violence even when they are, clearly, the perpetrators.  
This, in turn, results in constructing women‟s violence in a manner that differentiates 
it and pathologises it in comparison to men‟s more „natural‟ violence. 
And fourth, chapter six investigates how the conclusions drawn in the 
preceding sections hinder the protection of human rights during the legal and 
practical management of political violence at the international level. This chapter 
discusses the rights-related implications by separating them into three aspects of 
international public life: international criminal justice, international peace and 
reconciliation, and international security. As a final note, it is important to state that 
although the paper sometimes employs the phrase „women‟s violence‟ the term is 
used interchangeably with „women‟s political violence‟ as this essay only considers 
violent women in global politics and the public arena, and not women‟s violence in 
the private sphere. 
 
2. Developing the Theoretical Foundations 
 
2.1 DEFINING POLITICAL VIOLENCE 
The concept of political violence is widely contested with “boundaries and 
meanings that shift depending on cultural and community-specific circumstances”.2 
Nonetheless, there is general consensus that, first, such expressions of violence can 
involve both State and non-State actors,3 and, second, that it involves the threat or 
use of physical or psychological force to either institute change, or demonstrate 
resistance.4  For this reason, the concept of power becomes a defining feature of 
most discussions on political violence. In its most general sense, power is the 
capacity to use physical coercion to control activities, or to resist control by others.5   
The politics of „power‟ appear to become further pronounced by the disparate 
outcomes that result from sanctioning an act of violence as „political‟ versus 
„personal‟.  When an act is identified as „political‟, individuals and groups confer upon 
it an aura of legitimacy. In most societies, the patriarchal nature of the prevailing 
system ensures that men decide the “boundaries between political and personal 
violence”.6  
A feature shared by all expressions of political violence is its very „public‟ 
character. Political violence, by virtue of its objectives (these can be either ideological 
or value-oriented goals that the agent feels are best realised through a resort to 
force), is directed at the general public because its commission relies not only on 
physical brutality, but also on creating a spectacle of legitimacy and power.7  The 
dynamics of political violence almost always involve a level of political or ideological 
affiliation (i.e. it is rarely a single-handed undertaking), and usually a number of 
individuals work in concert to achieve a mutually valued objective.  
Encompassing the above concepts and ideas in a more precise and 
synthesised manner yields a definition of political violence that has four main 
components. First, political violence involves the threat or use of force by State or 
non-State actors in order to further a political, ideological or religious objective. 
Second, it may be utilised as a method of enforcing decisions that have a wider 
social importance, or as a means to resist any attempts of control; but in either 
situation it involves the desire (be it conscious or unconscious) to acquire or maintain 
power. Third, it is typically used by a group of individuals - though sometimes 
executed by only one - within the public sphere and on the general population. 
Fourth, since the determination of whether an act is considered „political‟ or „personal‟ 
is very much a product of power, the granting or withholding of such recognition can 
result in either legitimating an act of violence, or condemning it as unlawful.  
Similarly, terrorism is also a phenomenon with countless competing 
definitions, many of which are “politically loaded and reflect the interests and the 
power of the defining entity.”8 This paper will use Hoffman‟s definition of terrorism: 
the “deliberate creation and exploitation of fear through violence or the threat of 
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violence in the pursuit of political change”.9 Terrorism qualifies as an act of political 
violence because it has political aspirations, sometimes alluded to by the women 
engaging in the acts themselves (the primary subjects of the current paper),10 but 
almost always noted by the organisation on whose behalf they perpetrate their acts 
of terror. The act is (in relation to the current analysis) executed by non-State actors 
in order to express resistance to control, operationalised by a group of individuals 
affiliated with a particular organisation and/or ideology,11 and inflicted or perpetrated 
upon the general public (although some groups/institutions are targeted more than 
others).  
The acts of genocidal violence discussed during the course of this article have 
been widely documented as „genocides‟ in international law, and satisfy the 
conditions identifying such acts as laid out in the Genocide Convention of 1948.12  
Genocide also fulfils the criteria that determine whether certain conduct qualifies as 
„political violence‟. It is an act that is perpetrated by State actors for clear political 
purposes – primarily the annihilation of a particular social/ethnic group, or the 
realisation of an „ethnically pure‟ citizenry. It is also an act of violence directed at the 
public at large (not at particular individuals), though the destruction of one particular 
social/ethnic group is often the primary focus. 
 
2.2 Gender Stereotypes and Models of Femininity 
Gender is a socially constructed category that carries with it a set of underlying 
assumptions about masculinity and femininity. Its contribution to society lies in its 
ability to dictate what sorts of conduct, roles, and activities fall within the acceptable 
range for those perceived to be men and those perceived to be women.13 Wholly 
manufactured, and espousing a set of expected norms of behaviour (gender 
stereotypes), these unitary tropes of masculinity and femininity generate an image of 
women that is typically pacifist, compassionate, nurturing, and generally benign. 
Men, on the other hand, trumpeted as antithetical to women, become warring, 
ruthless, naturally competitive and aggressive.14 Described as never overlapping and 
completely distinct, this inflexible binary completely fails to acknowledge any 
possibility that individuals may embrace an identity that does not prescribe to this sort 
of strict male/female gender construct. 
Gender models have become entrenched in many aspects of public life. They 
are internalised by the societies in which they function, and preserved through 
categorising non-conforming behaviour (i.e. gender transgressions) as unacceptable 
and threatening.15 Since these behaviours represent aberrant conduct, and because 
there is a general consensus that understanding abnormalities helps to control 
them,16 it is these modes of conduct which become isolated objects of study and 
deconstruction.  
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 Consequently, the countless narratives that focus on interpreting and 
explaining women‟s violence do so largely because such behaviour challenges and 
contravenes conventional gender ideals of women as gentle and peace loving. These 
various narratives, therefore, inevitably engage in the „gendering‟ of violence – 
differentiating between the violence of women and that of men. As a result, the 
international system becomes privy to numerous accounts that juxtapose and 
contrast the violence of each, rather than recognising the synonymy of both. 
 
2.3 Recognising Victimhood 
Perhaps it is due to its „we know it when we see it‟ character that the notion of 
victimhood fails to possess a typological „checklist‟ against which victims can be 
identified with a degree of certainty and consistency. Despite the fact that little has 
been written on victimhood - as a concept on its own and disconnected from ideas 
such as crime, violence, law, culture, etc – the term brings to mind, at the very least, 
an assumption of innocence.  In so far as an individual is recognised as innocent with 
respect to a particular action, we can, at minimum, be certain of three things. First, 
that they have “not exercised [their] will”17 in relation to the said conduct, the 
implication being that their behaviour is involuntary and, perhaps, coerced.18 Second, 
they were powerless to prevent the commission of such an act (because the 
possession of power to prevent one‟s victimisation would essentially negate the 
notion of victimhood all togther). And third, because their conduct was both 
involuntary and unpreventable (by the agents themselves) individuals that are 
„innocent‟ cannot be considered completely culpable or responsible for the 
commission of the said act. Hence, in identifying an individual as a „victim‟ we, at 
least, prescribe to them a degree of innocence - incorporating a level of 
powerlessness, lack of agency, and a measure of blamelessness in relation to their 
conduct.  
The collective recognition of victimhood, however, is qualified. It is rare that 
individuals are recognised as absolute victims (i.e. those who cannot be blamed at all 
for their victimisation). Occurring along a continuum, victimhood positions the 
absolute victim and the guilty victim (i.e. those who may be at least partially or at 
most completely responsible for their victimisation) at opposing ends.19  There have 
been very few instances where absolute victimhood is jointly and commonly 
acknowledged, other than perhaps those situations involving children. Minors are 
frequently considered absolute victims by virtue of their age and the ideas associated 
with childhood (i.e. vulnerability and dependency). Even with the Holocaust, an 
emblematic event polarising the victim/perpetrator relationship, we find that there 
exists at least some literature that positions partial blame for the Jews‟ victimisation 
squarely on the shoulders of Jews, themselves.20 Even women are not absolute 
victims. There is frequent and marked mention of victimised women, notably in the 
context of sexual violence, bringing about their victimisation by being overly 
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provocative or overly emotional.21 Consequently, it is safe to say that in most 
instances the designation of victimhood does not entail absolute innocence, but 
relative innocence.  
Nevertheless, victim discourses challenge the idea of relative 
blame/innocence by creating rigid dichotomies that often result in exclusive claims 
being made by groups that seem to vacillate between absolute victim and absolute 
victimiser, but seldom lend themselves to a position somewhere in between the 
victim/perpetrator binary. Consequently, it is crucial to acknowledge that victimhood 
is not a unitary „all or nothing‟ category, and that the victimised are, in reality, 
positioned somewhere in between these two very distinct poles.  
As Wilke states, victimhood may be recognised as a status or an identity. 
„Victim-identity‟ describes an individual‟s self-identification as victim (or a collective 
identity based on shared victim status), or the imposition of a victim label on a social 
group that shares a historical experience of exclusion.22 Conversely, „victim-status‟ 
denotes the overall and widespread recognition of an individuals‟ victimhood. Whilst 
victim-identity depends on „subjective‟ feelings of injustice, victim-status is entirely 
reliant on the ability to authenticate an „objective‟ “breach of norms to the detriment of 
the „victim‟”.23 Thus, there is the possibility that an individual can possess a victim-
identity at any moment based on their perceived or real long-term oppression, or 
exclusion, even when an injurious breach of expectations cannot be found at that 
particular point in time.  
Within the context of violence, typically a violent act is not considered a 
product, but rather a cause, of victimhood. For instance, going back to the Holocaust, 
we perceive the genocide perpetrated by the Nazis as bringing about the 
victimisation of German Jewry rather than the violence being triggered by the Nazis‟ 
own victimisation. It is largely uncontroversial to make the claim that most 
perpetrators of political violence are seldom considered victims. However, this is 
because most perpetrators are men. In those rare instances when women become 
agents of political violence, they are perceived very differently than men who engage 
in brutality. It may be somewhat contentious, but nonetheless accurate, to make the 
claim that when a woman commits an act of violence she is rarely regarded as an 
agent of violence, and more often considered a victim herself.  Women‟s motivation 
to violence is frequently and consistently attributed to her own victimisation, rather 
than being regarded as a free and autonomous choice made by the women 
themselves. 
If putting this claim to the test we should expect that, if common perceptions of 
women‟s political violence were investigated, there would be a general consensus 
regarding women‟s (at least partial) innocence in reference to such acts. This should 
include viewing women‟s violence as devoid of agency, the women themselves as 
powerless, and, in some cases, treating or managing such violence in a manner that 
would suggest that these women were less culpable for their acts of brutality than 
men in similar or comparable situations. 
 
3. Common Social Perceptions: Narratives about Women’s Terrorist Violence 
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The proceeding two sections undertake an analysis of the dominant narratives 
that appear in order to make sense of women‟s participation in terrorism. Two case 
studies have been isolated for study, Palestinian suicide terrorists and the Rote 
Armee Fraktion. 
 
3.1 Providing the Context: Palestinian Women Suicide Terrorists 
Emerging against the backdrop of the first intifada, suicide missions first 
became a feature of the Palestinian struggle against Israeli occupation in 1987. 
Despite the ascertainable tactical advantages of employing women for such 
assignments,24 Palestinian female suicide terrorists were virtually invisible until the 
attack carried out by Wafa Idris in 2002.25 Since Idris, numerous Palestinian women 
have enlisted in self-destructive operations, at least fifteen of whom have been 
successful in carrying out such missions, with many more being apprehended during 
the process.26  In statements made by these women, both prior to an attack (i.e. in 
martyrdom videos), or after they have been detained, a diverse set of reasons have 
been reported as motivating factors, including the reinstatement of honour,27 quests 
for self-empowerment,28 and desire for vengeance.29 
  
3.2 Dominant Narratives about Women Suicide Bombers in Palestine 
Most common accounts that explain Palestinian women‟s involvement in 
suicide terror usually emphasise the oppressive nature of Muslim culture. 
Consequently, many of the stories that circulate about women suicide terrorists 
typically illustrate a preoccupation with honour – protecting it, reinstating it, and 
avenging it. Premising their arguments almost entirely on the fact that these women 
reside in an „oppressive‟ Muslim society - one that imposes an intense burden upon 
them to conform to a strict set of standards - these narratives claim that Palestinian 
women become terrorists because they are victims of a repressive culture which 
drives them to violence by erecting strict gender standards that these women may be 
unable or unwilling to fulfil.30 
References to violent women‟s personal histories (the majority of which 
confirm their unmarriageable status) are endemic to countless academic and media 
accounts of female suicide terrorists in Palestine. To illustrate, inconspicuously 
planted amidst the brief fragments of narrative that acknowledge Wafa Idris‟ 
ambulatory work with the Red Crescent, her “patriotic zeal”, and her resentment of 
the Israeli occupation, 31 there is regular mention of Wafa‟s status as a barren and 
divorced Palestinian woman – a status that, according to some, confined her to the 
“lowest social economic strata of society”.32 In this way, Wafa‟s violence becomes 
symbolic of the plight of all Palestinian women that have either never been able to, or 
have been unwilling to satisfy the roles prescribed to them by their oppressive 
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society. Confirming the impracticality of moving away,33 these narratives argue that 
women are compelled into violence as a result of undue pressure from a society that 
affords them no alternative role to wives and mothers, nor offers them the choice of 
physical escape from the conditions of their subjugation.  
According to some narratives, the pressures associated with a traditionally 
oppressive society are capitalised on by men who compel or encourage already 
desperate women to engage in violence on their behalf. In Wafa‟s case, several 
accounts achieve this by casting doubt on her level of agency in her violence. By 
juxtaposing her femininity – confirmed by giving due regard to her nurturing work as a 
paramedic – alongside the brutality of her crimes, these stories create an image of 
Wafa that is paradoxical and incongruent to widespread notions about women‟s 
„nature‟. This inconsistency is made more obvious in those accounts which note that, 
although Wafa did not belong to a terrorist organisation, she did have three brothers 
who were active members of Fatah.34  Though these accounts never go as far as 
fully blaming Wafa‟s brothers for her violence, they do successfully cast suspicion on 
the intentionality and wilfulness of her act, and thereby insinuate that her desperation 
(as an unmarriageable Palestinian woman) may have been exploited for the political 
purposes of the men in her life. 
Conversely, there are other stories that claim that women‟s unfortunate 
circumstances are not only manipulated by men, but also perpetuated by them. 
Women, like Andalib Suleiman,35 are portrayed as becoming the unsuspecting 
recruits of cruel men who specifically target them. In these accounts, women‟s 
participation in violence is ensured by male operatives who specifically seduce them, 
impregnate them, and later recruit them as suicide terrorists by declaring martyrdom 
a viable alternative to the humiliation and ostracism that awaits women who become 
pregnant outside of marriage; a methodical process that Dershowitz offensively 
refers to as “terrorist abortions”.36 In these narratives women become mere pawns of 
men‟s violence – „human bombs‟ that are essential but expendable.37 Men, on the 
other hand, become the self-aware agents of violence who are the only ones capable 
of politically-motivated acts of their own volition. 
Invoking the idea of the partially „guilty victim‟, several accounts purport that 
Palestinian women‟s exploitation by men is facilitated by women‟s natural proclivities 
for emotionality and a desire for male affection and belonging. According to these 
narratives women enlist in terrorist organisations to seek out relationships with men 
in a society where consorting between the sexes is typically impermissible.38  
Emphasis of women‟s natural inclinations also permeate those accounts that claim 
that Palestinian women engage in terrorism because it is a male-dictated form of 
atonement for women‟s sexual indiscretions,39 or because their culture designates it 
as a honourable way to seek forgiveness for permitting their sexuality to „run wild‟.40  
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These narratives imply that violence is an inevitable consequence of a woman failing 
to conform to her prescribed gender norms.  
 When little association can be made between a woman‟s violence and 
the men in her life, various narratives draw attention to the likelihood that women are 
driven to violent behaviours by their desire for self-empowerment in a society that 
has traditionally oppressed them. In this way, their violence becomes symbolic of 
their overall resistance to subjugation. Occasionally these conclusions are drawn 
from the statements of women terrorists themselves. However, in some instances it is 
extremely clear that there may be a discrepancy between what these women actually 
claim and what these accounts and reports want them to claim. For instance, in a 
well-publicised statement by Hamas operative, Leila Khaled, she declares that: 
Violence was a way of levelling the patriarchal society through revolutionary 
zeal – the woman would demonstrate that their commitment was no less than those 
of their brothers, sons or husbands. Strategically women [terrorists] are able to gain 
access to areas where men had greater difficulty because the other side assumed 
that the women were second-class citizens in their own society – dumb, illiterate 
perhaps, and incapable of planning an operation.41 [Emphasis added] 
From the above statement it is quite evident that self-empowerment was not 
Khaled‟s primary reason for pursuing violence. She makes this very clear in the three 
words that are barely given a second glance in the article in which her statement is 
reprinted, “through revolutionary zeal”. Khaled‟s violence was, first and foremost, a 
product of her political aspirations for „revolution‟ – to incite political change - the 
success of which was possible because men did not expect women to be capable of 
operationalising a mission of that calibre. Thus, in her mind, it was the success of her 
politically motivated operation that „levelled the patriarchal society‟. 
The sexualisation of women – the transformation of women from individuals to 
sexual objects – also becomes a prominent aspect of many narratives about women 
suicide terrorists in Palestine. A disproportionate level of emphasis is devoted to 
deconstructing and evaluating every aspect of a violent woman‟s physical 
appearance; aspects which are, at times, considered more important than her “ideas, 
policies and position”.42  These accounts luridly comment on the shape of the 
women‟s bodies, the colour of their hair, their manner of dress, and whether they 
would be considered „pretty‟ by common standards.43 As “beautiful female victims 
[…] often win […] sympathies more easily than others”,44 presenting these women as 
attractive was crucial to the narratives‟ overall construction of women as fragile and 
incapable of instigating acts of brutality.  
 
3.3 Providing the Context: Women Members of the Rote Armee Fraktion  
The brainchild of Ulrike Meinhof, Andreas Baader and Gudrun Ensslin, the 
Rote Armee Fraktion, began as a pacifist organisation aimed at protesting the 
American involvement in Vietnam (1968). However, soon after its inception, terrorism 
became the primary instrument of resistance against the allegedly exploitive liberal, 
democratic, capitalist order, both in Germany and beyond.45 At its zenith, the RAF 
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boasted a 40% female membership rate and participated in some of the most 
heinous acts of kidnapping, vandalism and murder.46 After being apprehended in 
1972, first Meinhof, and later Ensslin were found hanged in their cells.47  Although 
ultimately ruled suicides, some members of the RAF have always maintained that the 
German government was responsible for the deaths of both women.48 
 
3.4 Dominant Narratives about the Women Members of the RAF 
Even in describing women‟s involvement in violence in a society that does not 
necessarily possess an oppressive culture, and seems to espouse democratic and 
liberal ideals, prevailing narratives continue to explain women‟s violence by resorting 
to women‟s shared experiences of oppression and subjugation. In accounts about 
the Rote Armee Fraktion, violent women are described as victims of patriarchy, their 
own feminine nature, and suspected psychological and neurological abnormalities, all 
of which are described as factors that compel their resort to violence. 
 Pursuit of violence as a method of self-empowerment becomes a potent 
theme permeating many reports and articles on women members of the RAF. 
Frequently these narratives criticize women‟s violence as “excessive” - the measure 
of „excessive‟ determined through a comparison with men‟s more „temperate‟ 
violence.49  Sometimes, the perceived disproportionate level of ruthlessness of 
female RAF members is described as being demonstrative of a woman‟s need to 
compensate for her femininity.50 Such narratives suggest that women may be 
coerced into violence by a patriarchal system that erects men as the „ideal‟, and 
therefore makes it necessary that women mimic men to empower themselves51 and 
be considered men‟s „equals‟.   
Yet in other stories, women RAF members are represented as slaves of their 
passions and emotions, with their decision to enrol in the organisation portrayed as 
being entirely for „the sake of love‟.52 Women featured in these narratives are 
allegedly lured into violent organisations because their male intimate partners are 
active members.53 More interestingly, in other cases, women‟s violence is understood 
as having stemmed from their personal need to come to terms with the end of a past 
relationship. This became a central premise of those accounts that drew parallels 
between Gudrun Ensslin‟s involvement in the RAF, and her relationship with former 
lover Bernward Vesper.54 
Women members of the RAF were also perceived as having been drawn into 
violence by instances of extreme emotional distress, further aggravated by women‟s 
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overtly emotive nature. In some cases this was attributed to women‟s inability to 
engage in behaviours that are considered to be part of women‟s nature (i.e. 
motherhood). This was exemplified by the oral contraception theory once made 
public to explain the violent behaviours of female RAF members.55 Other times 
women‟s violence was imputed to past traumatic experiences that induced feelings of 
alienation56 or, in Meinhof‟s case, left these women suffering from low self-esteem.57  
In both instances, the argument being made by these narratives was that women 
were driven to violence by either emotional or psychological irregularities.  
A particularly noteworthy narrative that materialised during Meinhof‟s trial 
attributed her violence to brain damage that she may have sustained during a routine 
procedure several years prior to her involvement in terrorist activity. In order to verify 
this theory, several experiments were conducted on Meinhof‟s brain post-mortem. An 
extremely insidious aspect of the verification process was that Meinhof‟s results were 
compared to the brain of a known serial killer,58 leading one to assume that her 
motivations for engaging in violence were considered to be equivalent to those that 
prompted a serial killer to behave violently.59  
 
4. Common Social Perceptions: Narratives of Women’s Genocidal Violence 
 Following the format of the preceding chapter, the current one will 
undertake an examination of the most dominant narratives that discuss and interpret 
women‟s genocidal violence. Two case studies will be the objects of inquiry in this 
section: the violence of genocidaires Biljana Plavšić and that of Pauline 
Nyiramasuhuko. 
 
4.1 Understanding the Culprit: Biljana Plavšić and the Conflict in the Balkans  
The Balkan crisis reached its zenith in 1992 when Bosnian demands for 
secession from the former Yugoslavia drove Serbian forces to occupy the territory 
and instigate a campaign of genocide aimed at quashing the secessionist movement. 
Torture, murder and rape became prominent features of the Bosnian wartime 
experience. Rape, in particular, was employed to such a magnitude that it was legally 
documented as a deliberate and intentional strategy used by the Serbian State in 
order to bring about the social destruction of the Muslim population of Bosnia 
(Bosniaks).60 
At the time of the atrocities, Biljana Plavšić was the „hard-line deputy‟ to 
Serbian leader, and indicted genocidaires, Radovan Karadžić. For her participation in 
the conflict, Plavšić was indicted by the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY)61 on charges of genocide, crimes against humanity and war 
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crimes,62 but was eventually only charged and convicted for committing crimes 
against humanity.63  
 
4.2 Dominant Narratives about Biljana Plavšić 
 Inspecting the various stories in relation to the violence of Biljana Plavšić 
reveals that the common perception amongst most scholars, media experts and 
authors is that Plavšić‟s brutality could predominantly be attributed two things; first, to 
the men in Serbian politics; and second, to Plavšić‟s unsound „state of mind‟.   
In many reports about her violence, Plavšić is regularly portrayed as an 
innocuous and naïve woman, caught up in a „man‟s game‟ (i.e. politics). Frequently, 
this is achieved by emphasising her status as a „moderate‟ within the international 
community, and focusing on the centrality of her role in the overall implementation of 
the Dayton Agreement that helped Bosnia make the shift from conflict to peace.64 
The narratives highlight Plavšić‟s femininity by portraying her as a pacifist who 
genuinely wanted to end the conflict in the Balkans.  Though this was certainly a 
description of her that was severely contested by many survivors of the crisis,65 by 
presenting her as cooperative and peaceful these narratives succeeded in 
constructing an image of Plavšić that gave the impression that she was a woman 
who was unsuspectingly exploited by, first, her male colleagues, and later by the 
international criminal tribunal when she was indicted for crimes against humanity, 
genocide and war crimes.66 
According to these narratives, Plavšić‟s male colleagues were the primary 
„movers and shakers‟ within the region, and she, only nominated to political office 
because she was thought to be easily manipulated.67 Plavšić is portrayed as almost 
pitiable, misled into mistaking men‟s deception for camaraderie, and her political 
success as symbolic of her entry into the „boys club‟.68 This is an idea that Plavšić 
allegedly internalises in those accounts that either claim that she sometimes referred 
to herself as „a man‟,69 or those that report on her vehement refusal to testify against 
any of her male colleagues.70  Furthermore, in many narratives that describe 
Plavšić‟s reaction to the ICTY indictments, she is depicted as having „sacrificed 
herself‟ to an international tribunal that used legal pressure to compel her to testify 
against indicted men.71  In this way, Plavšić is presented as „doubly‟ victimised – 
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once by the men that implicitly „coerced‟ her into violence, and second by the 
international community that used her as a scapegoat for the crimes of men. 
However, in another set of stories, Plavšić‟s state of mind becomes the 
primary reason she is said to have engaged in violence. This is typically achieved by 
emphasising those behaviours that fail to correspond to the ideals we typically 
associate with „normal‟ women, and by interpreting this failure as „proof‟ of her 
unsound state of mind.  
Discussions relating to Plavšić‟s scandalous relationship with warlord Željko 
Ražnjatović “Arkan” are prevalent in most media reports about her role in the 
Bosnian genocide. Several articles and periodicals have embedded within their 
commentaries some mention of one exceptionally notorious incident where Plavšić 
steps over the body of a slain Bosniak to plant a kiss on Arkan‟s cheek.72  This 
particular display of affection purportedly occurred, after she witnesses Arkan‟s “grisly 
handiwork” in the town of Bijeljina, amidst the slaughter of civilians.73 These 
narratives insinuate that Plavšić‟s attraction to the murderous warlord hinged on an 
errant sexuality that somehow found brutality attractive.  Moreover, some media 
reports also claim that after kissing Arkan‟s cheek she uttered the words “my child” 
into his ear.74 In contrasting her sexuality alongside her capacity for motherhood, 
these narratives create an altogether iconic representation of Plavšić as one who 
forges a relationship with a brutal murderer that teeters on the brink of being 
incestual.75  Such accounts imply that Plavšić‟s genocidal violence may have been a 
symptom of an underlying psychological ailment (substantiated by her overtly deviant 
sexuality) – and give the impression that, “female sexuality at its worst is violent and 
brutal”.76  
 
4.3 Understanding the Culprit: Pauline Nyiramashuko and the Rwandan Crisis 
After years of hostility mounting between the two primary clans present in 
Rwanda, the Hutus and the Tutsis, the Rwandan conflict peaked in 1994 after the 
Hutu interim government claimed that the Tutsi-dominated RPF party was 
responsible for shooting down the plane of the Rwandan President, Juvénal 
Habyarimana. Between April 7 and July 4 of 1994, guerrilla forces made-up of mostly 
civilians, including women and children, slaughtered almost one million Tutsis and 
Hutu moderates.77  
During the hostilities, Pauline Nyiramasuhuko, a Hutu, was appointed as the 
Minister of Family and Women‟s Affairs.  It is claimed that was involved in instigating 
some of the most heinous acts of rape and murder against Tutsi civilians (the 
majority of which were women) In addition to being indicted by the International 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR),78 for crimes against humanity and genocide, 
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Nyiramasuhuko was also the first woman to be tried and convicted of genocidal rape 
for inciting and encouraging men under her command to brutally rape Hutu women.79 
Allegedly, one of the most horrifying examples of her depravity was that 
Nyiramasuhuko frequently encouraged her own son to commit acts of violence, and 
regularly persuaded him to rape and kill the women and children of villages they 
attacked.80 
 
4.4 Dominant Narratives about Pauline Nyiramasuhuko 
Perhaps the most prevalent image we get of Pauline Nyiramasuhuko from the 
assorted accounts written about her violence is that she was a sexually deviant and 
psychologically unbalanced woman. A series of narratives claim that Nyiramasuhuko 
frequently commanded the Interahamwe to rape Tutsi women before slaughtering 
them; ordering the rebel fighters to, especially target those young women who were 
“too proud of themselves”.81  These narratives assemble an image of 
Nyiramasuhuko‟s brutality that seems to cast doubt on the political nature of her 
violence. They achieve this by insinuating that if she was, indeed, motivated by her 
political objectives for a more „ethnically pure‟ and therefore, in the minds of many 
Hutus, a more just Rwandan society,82 she would not have ordered the women to be 
raped at all, but only killed. Thus, Nyiramasuhuko‟s incitement of rape becomes 
auxiliary to the actual political goal of annihilation.  In this way, her violence is 
portrayed as the work of someone who enjoyed degradation and torture.83 By casting 
her as a sadist, these narratives succeed in portraying brutality as an artefact of 
psychological pathology. 
Other stories that have surfaced about Nyiramasuhuko‟s violence seem to 
suggest that she may have effectively been coerced into violence by a traditionally 
patriarchal system that required her to adopt a level of brutality and ruthlessness – 
equal to or exceeding that of men (hypermasculinity) – as a pre-requisite for entry 
and participation in the traditionally male dominated public/political sphere (i.e. 
Rwandan politics).84  Nyiramasuhuko‟s desire to „masculinise‟ herself is confirmed by 
making use of witness accounts that claim that she swapped her colourful, feminine 
garb for army fatigues and a machine gun,85 and by frequently mentioning her 
decision to transgress her role as Minister for the Advancement of Women, opting 
instead to embrace the role of genocidaire.86 
According to several accounts, Nyiramasuhuko‟s violence may also have been 
provoked by her personal feelings of inadequacy and an unnatural proclivity for 
sexual competition. Reports concerning the Rwandan genocide describe 
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Nyiramasuhuko‟s violence in a manner that suggests that she had a personal 
vendetta against Tutsi women because she thought Hutu men found them more 
attractive and alluring.87 The explanation is supported by recurrent mention of 
Nyiramasuhuko‟s demand for the rape of Tutsi women who were “too proud of 
themselves”,88 and her insistence that the militia “kill the old” and “rape the virgins”89 
– the implication being that she targeted virgins because they are often perceived as 
being more appealing to men.  
By focusing on her role as Minister for the Family and Advancement of 
Women, and contrasting that with the extreme and horrific details of her incitement of 
sexual violence, these narratives construct Nyirmasuhuko as an abomination, a 
woman who possesses the capacity for both compassion (exemplified by her role as 
Minister), and brutality (illustrated by the descriptions of her crimes). By pathologising 
Nyiramasuhuko, these accounts reify universal feminine stereotypes and reinforce 
the common dyadic „victim/perpetrator‟ model of political violence that essentially 
claims that individuals can be either victims, or perpetrators, but never both.  
 
5. Women’s Victim-Identity and Repercussions for Women’s Political Violence 
Two important presumptions are generally implicit in all investigations of 
women‟s violence. First, it is automatically assumed that women‟s violence is 
different than men‟s. If it were not, there would be no reason to study the 
phenomenon separately – women‟s capacity for violence would be considered 
identical to men‟s capacity for violence. Thus no independent and distinct analysis of 
one, over the other, would be necessary. Second, there is an implied presumption 
that women‟s violence is atypical; for if it were not, there would be no need to isolate 
it as an object for further study because it would be within the parameters of 
acceptable and expected conduct for women. Nevertheless, putting these two 
presumptions aside, if we look strictly at the narratives themselves, how they are 
constructed, what they say, and the underlying assumptions that they make, it is 
easily discernable that these stories constantly and consistently draw upon gender 
norms in their explanations of violent women and the brutality they perpetrate.   
In order to explain the violence of Wafa Idris, most narratives refer to her 
nurturing work as a paramedic to confirm her femininity. In so doing, her violence 
becomes classified as irregular (because natural women are nurturers, but not 
violent). This makes it possible for these narratives to draw on other potential motives 
for her brutality – namely her brothers, and her oppressive culture.  Similarly, 
narratives that discussed the violence of Biljana Plavšić repeatedly mention her 
integral role in implementing the Dayton Agreement, an undertaking that confirms her 
naturally pacific and non-violent nature as a woman, and thereby rendering her 
violence atypical. In Plavšić‟s case, the narratives made sense of her brutality by 
attributing it to her male colleagues in the government.     
The problem that arises, however, is that in the process of making sense of 
these particular instances of women‟s violent behaviours, these narratives generate a 
whole set of assumptions about women‟s political violence in general. First, because 
women‟s violence is construed as involuntary, her acts fail to acquire the same level 
of agency as men‟s acts of violence. Second, since women‟s brutality is attributed to 
factors beyond her control (i.e. the men in her life, her society, her psychopathology), 
her violent tendencies are typically considered as being inspired by non-political 
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factors (i.e. for the „sake of love‟ or because of sexual competition). Third, as already 
noted, because women‟s violence is interpreted by relying on feminine gender 
stereotypes, female brutality becomes categorised as irregular and aberrant.  
A further implication of the way in which women‟s violence is envisaged is that 
brutal women are frequently portrayed as being powerless to control their violent 
actions, and thus somewhat absolved of the degree of responsibility that normally 
attaches to a wilful and intentional act of violence. In situations where women act 
violently because of an alleged psychological abnormality, their violence becomes 
the product of an innate and unavoidable biological defect. Likewise, when women 
behave violently in order to empower themselves, the blame for their desire to want 
to do so shifts to a patriarchal social system that has historically marginalised women 
and erected masculinity as the „ideal‟. In each situation, women become 
characterised as helpless and defenceless. 
Going back to the second chapter of this article and the ideas associated with 
recognising victimhood, casting women‟s violence as less blameworthy, lacking 
agency, and being the product of women‟s powerlessness, certainly appears to 
qualify women as victims – at least in the context of political violence. Consequently, 
it is accurate to make the claim that we continue to, perhaps subconsciously, 
perceive women as victims even in those instances where they are clearly the 
perpetrators of violence. The implications of this recognition of victimhood, however, 
become far more pronounced and amplified when we take a look at how we respond 
to political violence at the international level.  In these instances, continuing to 
perceive women as possessors of a persistent status of victimhood has profound 
consequences for the human rights protections of both violent women, as well as a 
number of other actors in global politics who might occupy a space in between and 
beyond the very absolute categories of „victim‟ and „perpetrator‟. 
 
6. Methods of Violence-Management and the Protection Of Human Rights 
This section of the article assesses how the gendering of violence influences 
the legal management of political violence at the international level. It limits its 
examination to the two types of political violence that have been previously 
discussed: terrorism and genocidal violence, and bases its investigation on three 
different aspects of international public life: international criminal justice, international 
peace and reconciliation, and international security. 
It is undeniable that the current ways in which we respond to violence at the 
international level illustrates an unqualified acceptance of women‟s victim-identity.  In 
the past this acceptance has affected judicial recognition of the possibility that violent 
women can be fully responsible for their acts of brutality (and should therefore be 
punished accordingly). Moreover, additional problems also begin to surface in those 
situations when women‟s victimhood is considered axiomatic, particularly in the 
context of gendered crimes. Nonetheless, this article does not confine its analysis to 
only the human rights implications of past methods of violence management, but 
delves a little deeper to look at what sorts of problems a „women as victims‟ response 
will have on the future management of political violence, including the possibility that 
refusing to see women as political agents (or agents of violence), bars them from 
future peace processes within their communities, as well as poses problems for 
international security and the unfair targeting of all women. 
 
6.1 International Criminal Justice 
Drawing on the discipline of international criminal justice (ICrimJ), this section 
investigates not only the legal inadequacies that plagued the international trial of 
Biljana Plavšić, but also draws attention to what sorts of jurisprudential victories the 
court‟s decision in Nyiramasuhuko represented.  However, staying true to the actual 
discipline of ICrimJ,90 this section of the paper does not merely highlight the juridical 
oversights and triumphs of the courts, but also considers the problems associated 
with the development of the positive law that governs certain crimes (i.e. gendered 
crimes), grounding both in the human rights implications that surface as a result. In 
this context then, the link that is identified is that gendering violence affects not only 
the courts‟ responses to such violence, but also the development of crimes in 
international law.  Both, in turn, contribute to the victims‟ overall opinion of justice 
having been delivered (or not).  In undertaking this inquiry, it is found that the law is 
very much entangled with social perception (in this case, those relating to gender) 
and impressions of social justice. 
 
6.1.1 The International Courts and the Prosecution of Violent Women 
 Victimhood occurs along a continuum. This means that victims are not 
necessarily and categorically innocent, and, therefore, they can be considered at 
least partially, or at most largely (but never entirely), responsible for their commission 
of crimes.91 Denying a perpetrator agency in their crime has tremendous influence on 
their degree of culpability and responsibility for such actions. With respect to handling 
women‟s participation in atrocity, denying women agency in their brutality has had 
two important consequences for legally managing their acts of violence. First, 
occasionally it has led to the courts all together rejecting women‟s blameworthiness 
for acts that have been attributed to them. And second, it has led the courts to mete 
out disproportionately lower sentences to women as compared to men perpetrators 
committing similar acts of violence.  We can identify both consequences quite clearly 
in Plavšić. 
 Despite the fact that Plavšić‟s initial indictment specifically listed her has 
having been involved in “planning, instigating, ordering or committing […] or aiding 
and abetting”92 the commission of sexual violence against Bosniaks, this element of 
her crime received little attention during the prosecution and sentencing process. 
Although „sexual violence‟ was subsumed under her overarching charge of 
persecution including cruel and inhumane treatment, Plavšić was never explicitly 
indicted for committing or facilitating rape in detention centres like the ones in Zvornik 
at the Ekonomija farm and the Čelopek camp.93 Part of this can be attributed to the 
fact that the definition of sexual violence is quite ambiguous. However, there is also a 
strong possibility that the failure to consider the charge arose from widespread 
perception that women cannot be perpetrators of sexual violence, only its victims. 
                                           
90
 Roberts‟ maintains that ICrimJ not only includes international criminal law (including the institutions and mechanisms charged 
with its practice), but also includes the philosophical, historical and normative frameworks that underpin how the international 
community deals with international crime. Thus, its concerned with not only „meting out justice‟, but also with victims‟ 
perceptions of justice having been served. In this respect, ICrimJ is an enterprise that encompasses both the institutionalised 
aspects of justice (i.e. courts, tribunals, etc), but also the less institutionalised components of justice – truth-telling, collective 
memory-making (the political functions of justice). See, Paul Roberts (2007), “Comparative Law for International Criminal 
Justice”, in Esin Orucu and David Nelken eds., Comparative Law: A Handbook, Portland, USA: Hart Publishing, 339-365. 
91
 If they were entirely responsible for their crimes, they would fail to be „victims‟, in the general sense of the term. 
92
 Prosecutor v. Plavšić, supra note 62, pp.21(c). 
93
 Angela M. Banks (2005) “Sexual Violence and International Criminal Law: An Analysis of the Ad Hoc Tribunal‟s Jurisprudence 
& The International Criminal Court‟s Elements of Crime”, The Hague: Women’s Initiatives for Gender Justice, p 28, 
<http://web.wm.edu/law/faculty/documents/banks-969-7375.pdf>, accessed on 3 September 2009. It has also been argued that 
„inhumane treatment‟ is a more ambiguous charge, and can have different meaning than a charge of rape. See, Julie Mertus 
and Olja Hocevar Van Wely (2004), “Women‟s Participation in the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia 
(ICTY): Transitional Justice for Bosnia and Herzegovina”, Women Waging Peace Policy Commission, p 19, 
<http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/pdf-files/Soc_Psych_of_Terrorism.pdf> accessed on 22 August 2009. 
Additionally, failing to recognise women‟s agency in her violence, and continuing to 
perceive women as victims in political violence, also resulted in the courts dropping 
Plavšić‟s most egregious charges (those of genocide), despite her admission of guilt.  
As a consequence of both these oversights, Plavšić received a lesser sentence than 
other admittedly guilty men who had committed less severe crimes and occupied less 
powerful positions of authority.94   
Commending Plavšić for her confession of guilt, the courts premised the 
severity of her sentence (or lack thereof) on the transformative potential of her 
admission of guilt.95 However, despite the courts‟ emphasis on the need to see the 
tribunals‟ work as facilitating reconciliation through truth-telling and the acceptance of 
responsibility, the severity of sentences handed down to admittedly guilty men seem 
to cast serious suspicion on the court‟s proclaimed reasoning.96 In other trials of the 
same calibre (i.e. Kambanda, Babić, and Nikolić) professions of guilt yielded life, 
thirteen years, and twenty-seven years of imprisonment, while Plavšić‟s admission of 
guilt yielded only eleven. Why was a contribution to reconciliation considered a 
mitigating factor in her sentencing, but not in the sentencing of other, less culpable 
male genocidaires?97 Apart from the idea that Plavšić‟s gender (and not the guilty 
plea) may have been the primary mitigating factor, the trial chamber‟s decision also 
implies that men‟s admission of guilt is considered indicative of their status as wilful 
and rational agents, while Plavšić‟s (and by extension women‟s) is not.  This 
inconsistency was particularly prominent in the court‟s analysis of the relationship 
between guilt and remorse, one in which gender becomes a crucial factor in the 
court‟s overall reasoning. 
In Kambanda the tribunal‟s court maintained that remorse and admission of 
guilt are unrelated, and that the latter cannot automatically give rise to the former. As 
such they insisted that both guilt and remorse be considered separately during the 
prosecution/sentencing process.98 However, in Plavšić the judges ruled against this 
claim, and insisted that mitigation for remorse was connected with mitigation arising 
from a guilty plea – suggesting that in her case (unlike in the cases of men who pled 
guilty), an admission of guilt was inherently linked to an experience of remorse.99 
Thus, in Plavšić the defendant‟s (and by extension, women‟s) confession of guilt 
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became symbolic of her regret and remorse – an idea that is somewhat discredited 
by the many statements Plavšić has made following her indictment and 
prosecution.100  The court, in this instance, considered femininity intrinsically linked to 
emotionality, in which case Plavšić‟s confession of guilt became symbolic of her 
overall „feelings‟ of remorse.  
In comparison, when looking at Nyiramasuhuko‟s judgment, we find that the 
notion of women‟s victim-identity also becomes an extremely important element 
during her prosecution. However, while the courts drew on women‟s victim-identity in 
Plavšić‟s trial, in Nyiramasuhuko‟s trial, the accused herself attempted to verify her 
innocence by appealing to this classification.101  
The primary line of defence pursued by Nyiramasuhuko‟s attorneys rested on 
exploiting common gender stereotypes that essentially claimed that women were 
naturally inclined to peace. It was argued that her status as a „mother‟ guaranteed, 
without a doubt, that Nyiramasuhuko could not have committed the crimes for which 
she was being indicted; maintaining that brutality was not in women‟s maternal 
nature, that women who were mothers could not be both the „bearers of life‟, and its 
takers.102  Nyiramasuhuko intended to capitalise on the common social perception (or 
misperception) that mothers are incapable of being murderers.103 In a final attempt to 
prove her innocence, Nyiramasuhuko also appealed to her victim-identity as a 
woman by claiming that she was being used as a scapegoat for men‟s violence, and 
that she was essentially a victim of sexism and was targeted by men as a result of 
her position as a powerful and educated woman in Rwandan society.104  Pauline 
Nyiramasuhuko‟s self identification as a „victim‟ is illustrative of the fact that that it is 
an identity that is not only projected onto women by men, but also internalised and 
capitalised on by women themselves. 
The fact that Nyiramasuhuko‟s entire defence relied on proving her innocence 
by appealing to an idealised gender model and widespread notions of what is not 
only acceptable conduct for women, but also natural conduct for women, says a 
great deal about just how thoroughly entrenched ideas about gender have become.  
It also confirms that women‟s victimhood has become both a very significant aspect 
of their identity, as well as an expected and accepted facet of femininity in general. It 
is a construction that pervades not only the private sphere, but invades political life 
and has a tremendous influence on the development of legal norms and conduct.   
Trials conducted at the international tribunals serve two important functions. 
The first is not difficult to discern: they are meant to administer justice and put an end 
to the culture of impunity that prevails during episodes of conflict. In addition, 
however, tribunals also serve a second, political (societal) function.105  Considered 
exercises in peace and reconciliation, the cases that filter through the tribunal courts 
are important for providing closure for the victims of violence; are necessary for 
developing a collective memory of individual experiences of atrocity; and are meant 
to deter future violence by discrediting the perpetrators and ending the culture of 
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impunity that prevails during episodes of conflict.106 For some, building a collective 
memory is crucial for creating a common post-conflict national identity and 
establishing social solidarity among citizens.107 It is undeniable that the judgment in 
Plavšić failed on both accounts.  
First, the disproportionate sentence that Plavšić received in comparison to 
other men having committed less serious crimes has had a profound effect on her 
victims‟ perceptions of justice. Furthermore, the leniency of her punishment could 
certainly be considered an affront to their sense of dignity, and certainly damaged the 
credibility of the tribunal in the eyes of those most harmed during the conflict.108 
Plavšić‟s sentence confirmed the widespread belief that the crisis was able to occur 
with relative impunity.109 Second, failing to prosecute Plavšić for both genocide and 
war crimes charges has effectively created a gap in the historical (factual) record of 
those crimes – at least in terms of her involvement in them. The tribunal‟s decision to 
discount Plavšić‟s involvement in these crimes halted any hopes for internationalised 
forms of justice in which victims may be able communicate their experiences of war 
to build a shared memory of the crimes perpetrated against them.  
Creation of a communal memory of atrocity, and the ability to voice one‟s 
experiences of the horrors of war, is an important aspect for the preservation of 
human rights because it helps to deter future conflict and the human rights violations 
that go along with it by creating a common notion of a shared national identity 
premised on the humanity (and thus equal right to citizenship) of all participants. Not 
only do these trials serve a therapeutic purpose for the victims, but they also help to 
build the foundations upon which parties to an ending conflict can build mutual 
respect for each other through the recognition of each other‟s place within the 
regional/national community. An enduring transition to peace is cultivated only by 
forging an improved relationship, where the „victim‟ parties have the satisfaction of 
knowing that justice has been served, and where the „victimisers‟ (to use a very 
inflexible dichotomy for the sake of clarity) are made to realise that future acts of 
violence and persecution will not go unnoticed and unpunished. 
 
6.1.2 Defining, Identifying and Managing Gendered Crimes 
Interpreting women‟s victimhood as axiomatic has been particularly 
problematic for defining and managing certain crimes that appear to affect only 
women, but in reality, also significantly affect men. At times, women have been 
recognised as “occupy[ing] a biologically determined victim status in sexual 
violence”.110 Though this has now been proven to be untrue (as recently women have 
been identified as perpetrators of such violence), contemporary methods of 
managing such violations suggest that we may still be holding on to this 
misconception. The concept of gendered crimes is a good example of where the 
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absolute acceptance of women‟s status as the victims of violence was incorporated 
into the legal definition of the crime, and ultimately had a significant impact on how 
the international system handled its commission. 
Gendered crimes are those crimes that target specific individuals based on 
their actual or perceived gender. Including, among others, rape, sexual violence, 
domestic violence and sexual harassment, gendered crimes are typically 
misogynistic crimes that are usually perpetrated by men against women.111 As such, 
the way in which certain gendered crimes, like rape, have been defined in 
international law veils the fact that these crimes can be, and are very much, part of 
men‟s wartime experiences. Furthermore, these established legal definitions have 
also made women‟s commission of gendered crimes against other women, legally 
impossible.  For instance, rape has been legally defined as „non-consensual sexual 
intercourse‟,112 which meant that women (because of their anatomical limitations) 
could never be held legally or criminally liable for raping other women. It is irrefutable 
that such definitions fail to recognise the realities of war and conflict, and encompass 
the view that women‟s classification as victims is absolute in the context of sexual 
violence.  
One of the problems that arise with these very ambiguous characterisations of 
gendered crimes is that, more often than not, the courts are extremely reluctant to 
push the parameters of, and reformulate, these very murky definitions. This was 
particularly evident in Plavšić‟s case and the ICTY‟s failure to charge Plavšić with 
sexual violence.113  The way in which gendered crimes have historically been 
constructed and socially perceived has, in turn, had significant influence on the 
groups of people that can be legitimately held responsible for committing such 
crimes. Hence, if gendered crimes like genocidal rape are, “the most extreme site of 
women‟s marginalisation, a key threat to women‟s security, a communication of 
domination, and an integral part of the system ensuring the maintenance and 
subordination of women”114 – how can we possibly make sense of women‟s 
perpetration of such crimes?  If genocidal rape is really a form of gendered violence, 
then cases like Plavšić‟s and Nyiramasuhuko‟s would literally be instances of 
“gendered oppression [being] committed by the oppressed on the oppressed”.115  
Seen from this angle, it is hardly surprising that the ICTY chose not to become 
entangled in reformulating the meaning and definition of sexual violence as a 
gendered crime and opted to disregard Plavšić‟s involvement in sexual violence, 
electing instead to indict her for violations that were more „precise‟ and, therefore, 
easily verifiable and far less contentious.116 
Comparatively, the ICTR‟s decision in Nyiramasuhuko has therefore been 
nothing short of groundbreaking. The recognition that women can be held legally 
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culpable for rape against other women has profound significance for the human 
rights of both current and future victims of genocidal rape.  Perhaps the most 
important of these is the fact that it has paved the way for greater awareness and 
recognition of wartime man-on-man sexual violence – an experience that appears to 
be extremely prevalent in contemporary wars, yet continues to be somewhat 
understudied.117 Moreover, the ICTR‟s general move to reformulate the idea of rape 
from simply a violation that involves physical intercourse, to a definition which is more 
comprehensive and inclusive of practices like the use of inanimate objects for 
penetration, and the imposition of non-physical sexual behaviours (e.g. undressing in 
public when such behaviour is intolerable in the victim‟s own culture),118 can be 
considered more appropriate for addressing the wartime experiences of both men 
and women. 
This move towards recognising women‟s violence as representative of the 
human capacity for violence has, in the case of gendered crimes, led to a more 
comprehensive definition of genocidal rape, one that takes into account more fully 
the realities of war. Furthermore, the shift towards a broader definition can also be 
considered meaningful because it represents a move away from an unwavering 
acceptance of women‟s victim-identity in the context of violence, and perhaps, marks 
a turning point in the need to employ inflexible binary (men/women) gender 
categories to explain and respond to expressions of political violence. Indeed, the 
latter can be considered a victory for the women‟s rights movement with reference to 
future prospects for equal recognition for men and women, or even for the „women‟s 
rights as human rights‟ movement in their endeavour to promote the “humanity” of 
women and to acquire acknowledgement of women‟s rights as a set of universal and 
inalienable „human rights‟.119 
In spite of this progress, however, successful future prosecutions of women 
perpetrating genocidal rape or sexual violence may be impeded by feminist critics 
who have demonstrated a degree of ambivalence in response to this shift away from 
gendering crimes. They claim that reformulating wartime rape from its current status 
as a gendered crime to one in which both men and women can be considered both 
perpetrators and victims, fails to acknowledge women‟s differently situated position in 
patriarchal society.120 In reality, however, rape carries with it a social stigma that can 
be considered injurious for all its victims, men and women. If violated women are 
emblematic of men‟s inability to protect their communities, then the violated bodies of 
men is a far more compelling symbol of men‟s powerlessness in the face of their 
enemies. 
 
6.2  International Peace and Reconciliation 
 Perhaps the most important feature of political violence is that it is motivated 
by a „political objective‟. The general perception (extracted from the various 
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narratives examined in chapter three and four) is that women cannot be considered 
legitimate agents of their own acts of political violence. In situations where they are 
merely the pawns of men‟s brutality, it is the men that become the „formulators‟ of the 
underlying political objectives of the act. In instances where women‟s political 
violence is facilitated or motivated by their psychological abnormalities, they are 
generally seen as losing the capacity to make informed and rational decisions – and 
therefore incapable of devising the political aspirations underpinning such acts of 
violence. On these occasions women‟s violence is described as personally motivated 
and, often, unnatural. This poses many problems for the continued respect for 
women as reasonable political agents.  Failing to see women as rational political 
actors presents some very significant challenges for women‟s engagement in peace 
and reconciliation initiatives and their access to greater decision-making power, both 
of which are regularly considered to be important post-conflict empowerment 
strategies for men and women residing in previously conflict-laden regions. 
 
6.1.1 Restricting Women from Peace Initiatives 
An essential element of post-conflict peace initiatives is the allocation of and 
access to power. On the surface, peace agreements have a human rights component 
because they frequently address concerns relating to minority rights and self-
determination.121 However, less noticeable are the rights-related opportunities that 
these agreements present for addressing structural inequalities, particularly those 
relating to gender. Despite the fact that many international instruments have 
emphasised the right of women to full and equal political participation in public life, 
including the Beijing Platform for Action, 122 and the landmark Security Council 
„Resolution 1325‟ in 2000,123 women continue to remain absent from the majority of 
peace initiatives being concluded internationally.124 Because post-conflict peace 
processes symbolise a „new beginning‟ for all actors in conflict, they present an ideal 
forum for bridging the public/private divide, and for “expos[ing] the politics inherent in 
the traditional primacy of civil and political rights”.125 In this way, they can be 
considered essential and crucial elements for addressing the rights of women in any 
society.  
 Central to the process of peace negotiations is the decommissioning of 
violence and encouraging warring factions to substitute peaceful debate for violent 
contestation over sensitive and disputed issues. This presumes that historical 
instances of violence were aimed at achieving political goals and that States and 
groups can achieve peace by offering violent groups concessions in order to meet 
those objectives.126  However, since women‟s participation in violence is regularly 
perceived as being motivated by personal (and not political) reasons the absence of 
women from peace initiatives and negotiations can at least partly be attributed to the 
fact that women‟s violence is never understood as a potential hindrance to 
reconciliation processes. Women‟s engagement and cooperation is, therefore, 
deemed inconsequential by the parties that are trying to achieve and maintain peace. 
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Accordingly, women continue to occupy spaces on the periphery of global politics, 
with their voices being effectively silenced from the decisions that will supposedly 
move their communities from episodes of violence to ones of relative stability. 
This issue is particularly relevant when one takes into consideration the 
various peace initiatives that have taken place in, for instance, Palestine, from which 
women have been completely absent.127 Owing to restrictive cultural sanctions, 
Palestinian women are typically barred from public life and are, therefore, unable to 
participate in peace initiatives as part of legitimate political organisations.128  
However, while men‟s involvement in terrorism has frequently resulted in greater 
decision-making power - premised on the belief that negotiation may suppress further 
violence - women‟s violence has not achieved a similar reaction.129 It can certainly be 
argued that part of the trouble may well be that women‟s violence is rarely ever 
considered indicative of the human capacity for violence. Hence, the gendering of 
violence has prevented women‟s participation in atrocity from being considered 
regular, possible and natural, and therefore influential to maintaining lasting peace. In 
this respect, it is usually the men of a society that are regularly regarded as having 
the greatest degree of power to prevent further violence – a view that has resulted in 
women being permanently sidelined in peace-building initiatives.  
As Chinkin notes, involving women in public life, including decision-making 
during peace negotiations, is “demanded by human rights standards for equality and 
fairness”, and is a commitment that almost all States have conceded to when 
ratifying the „Women‟s Charter‟ (CEDAW).130  If violence and conflict are seen as 
“windows of opportunity” for traditionally marginalised groups to exert influence over 
the shaping of the world,131 then continuing to view women as only victims in political 
violence tends to reject the possibility that they can be powerful and significant 
political actors in the move to peace. In these instances, women run the risk of being 
as oppressed in their commission of brutality, as they have been in situations in 
which they are the primary victims of violence. 
Nonetheless, it is important to note that the idea of placing women in 
leadership roles will quell their desire for violence132 is also far too simplistic, and 
does not quite capture the dynamic nature of women‟s violence. Women are not, 
themselves, monolithic blocs who are identically inspired into behave violently. Thus, 
greater involvement in peace initiatives does not necessarily guarantee that all 
women will discontinue engaging in violence, but it does ensure that women will 
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continue to have a space available for the peaceful negotiation of those demands 
and rights that may have prompted them to violent behaviour in the past. 
 
 
6.3 International Security 
An unfortunate consequence of perceiving women as the „eternal victims in 
violence‟ is that we tend to construct women‟s brutality (when it occurs) as unusual 
and abnormal. Inherent in this construction is the idea that since the occurrence is 
not natural, and because it disrupts current models of socially accepted behaviours 
for women, it must unarguably be more dangerous and threatening than natural 
expressions of violence – men‟s violence.  The problem with this sort of 
categorisation of women‟s brutality is that it has historically been prone to exploitation 
by States in order to justify both the excessive use of force against violent women, as 
well as the targeting of civilian women.  
 
6.3.1 Magnifying Women’s Dangerousness 
Prominent historical examples illustrate that there have been instances where 
States have adopted counter-violence procedures that construct violent women as 
more threatening merely because their status as „warriors‟ is difficult to ascertain (i.e. 
femininity is used to disguise dangerousness). One particularly significant instance 
occurred during the Russian occupation of Chechnya and the subsequent targeting 
of all Chechen women as possible combatants.133  It was claimed by Russian forces 
that because it was difficult to determine between women who were part of the 
shakhidki (black widows) and those that were genuine civilians, the military had to be 
particularly vigilante and consider all women possible combatants until they could 
prove otherwise. In this way, the Russian militia was able to institute „shoot first, think 
later‟ counter-insurgency strategies against all Chechen women, prompting their 
removal from the sphere of civil immunity, and resulting in the targeting of innocent 
civilians.134  By using gender stereotypes to illustrate the irregularity of violent 
women, and constructing women‟s brutality as particularly threatening and menacing, 
the military was able to evade legal responsibility for their targeting of civilians and 
their violations of international humanitarian law.135   
 Similarly, contemporary American counter-terrorism strategies and security 
measures have also employed gender stereotypes in order to transform all women 
into possible combatants. The Department of Homeland Security has isolated 
pregnant women as possible security threats by stating that women terrorists may 
use pregnancy prosthetics in order to smuggle bombs across airport checkpoints.136 
By considering all women potential combatants masquerading as benign and 
submissive would-be mothers, States have invented a perpetual „state of emergency‟ 
that necessitates „extreme vigilance‟ in identifying and thwarting the attacks of vicious 
terrorists that may be disguised as beguiling and innocent females. As a result, 
measures that would otherwise be an infringement on the rights of those being 
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targeted (i.e. pregnant women) are now being seriously contemplated and put to use. 
Claims such as these function by implying that the inability to tell between women 
who are genuinely pregnant and those who are feigning pregnancy makes women, 
as a group, a much greater threat to international security. Accordingly, procedures 
such as invasive physical searches and even documented medical evidence to verify 
pregnancy - requirements that would normally be considered a breach of women‟s 
right to privacy and dignity - may very well become part of standard airport protocol in 
the future. Such discriminatory measures unfairly and disproportionately target 
women as a group, and construct all women as likely threats to international security. 
The problem lies not in the actual „profiling‟ of terrorists (although that in itself 
is fraught with its own set of challenges), but that such activities discriminate against 
a particular social group (i.e. pregnant women). Also, because the widespread 
perception is that suicide terrorists are typically not the blond-haired, blue eyed, 
westernised woman, pregnant women of Arab descent, or with „Muslim-sounding‟ 
names, and traditional Islamic attire will be doubly effected by the intersection 
between terrorism stereotypes and gender. Human rights experts have vehemently 
criticised the racial profiling of potential terrorists, claiming that the practice 
contravenes international human rights standards - that it is discriminatory137 and an 
infringement of individual civil liberties.138 However, this particular example of profiling 
can be seen as particularly problematic because it involves not only racial profiling, 
but gender profiling as well – so that women of a particular race and culture are 
doubly harmed by such measures. 
 There are at least two principle assumptions that render the profiling of women 
terrorists additionally unacceptable and discriminatory.  First, the prevailing views on 
women‟s violence consider it irregular, and sometimes the product of a psychological 
abnormality. Thus, as indicated by both the Russian and American examples, women 
are more likely to be construed as far more menacing than men terrorists: first, 
because their violence is considered to be the product of some sort of pathology that 
renders them „unreasonable; and second, as a result of the idea that violent women 
are more ruthless than men because they need to, in some way, „compensate for 
their femininity‟.139  As a result, the use of excessive force may become more justified 
when security threats involve women. This may be further problematised in 
communities stricken with conflict (e.g. Israel), where the identification of possible 
terrorists may serve both a human security function, but also a political function (e.g. 
illustrating the „inhumanity‟ of Palestinians). In these situations, women become 
additionally vulnerable under State-instituted security procedures. Secondly, Muslim 
women are frequently thought of as bastions of family honour and reputation, and 
restrictions on their sexual conduct are described as necessary precautions to 
preserve that honour.140 Due to cultural notions of modesty, invasive search 
procedures at airport checkpoints may be especially problematic for protecting the 
right to dignity and security of person in reference to women belonging to 
communities that ascribe to a strict set of cultural ideals about proper/improper 
conduct for women.  
 On the other end of the spectrum, however, there are also security experts 
who claim that gender stereotypes have clouded State judgment in relation to 
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women‟s involvement in and capacity for terrorism.141 They emphasise past 
instances in which women have been able to bypass security by strapping bombs to 
their bodies and feigning pregnancy, like the case of Hanadi Jaradat,142 or discuss 
other situations in which women have been able to smuggle bombs through 
checkpoints by either refusing to undergo intrusive searches for cultural reasons, or 
by „Westernizing‟ their appearance to avoid arousing suspicion.143  Security experts 
are claiming that States are too focused on these near-universal gender stereotypes 
of women as naturally non-violent and benign, and that this may be preventing State 
from exercising the level of caution needed in order to prevent women from engaging 
in atrocities that lead to many civilian casualties.  According to this view, terrorists 
pose a threat to the human rights protections of civilians, including the right to life, 
and the “human dignity of the individual person not to be used as the instrument of 
another‟s ideology”.144 
 
6.4 Synthesising the Problems of Public Life: Outlining the Limits of the Law 
The Human Rights Movement employs the language and the institutions of 
law to limit the harm that the powerful inflict on the vulnerable.145 
If the human rights movement, as Fitzpatrick claims, relies on law to propagate its 
values, ideals, and ideologies, to enhance the protection of the „vulnerable‟ against 
the „powerful‟, then this chapter has illustrated the limits of law for the realisation, 
respect, and preservation of individual human rights. Indeed, the law is not infallible. 
By virtue of the fact that humans defend and shape the law, the legal framework is as 
much linked to occasionally unsound social opinions, as it is to the overarching and 
altruistic ideals of the perfect utopian world. Accordingly, it is as susceptible to 
individual biases, discriminatory conduct, and fallacious reasoning as any human-
developed institution. As a result, mitigating episodes of women‟s political violence 
through the law can present many challenges for a neutral and non-discriminatory 
approach to managing women‟s brutality.  
It has clearly been demonstrated that interpreters of the law (e.g. judges, 
international organisations, human rights activists) certainly have their own 
presumptions and prejudices. In Plavšić the court‟s perception of women, in general, 
had significant influence over how the accused was finally sentenced and punished 
for her crimes. As such, regardless of the substantive rules prescribed in law, those 
that interpret and defend it seem to have a great deal of power in shaping the way 
those rules control conflict. Sometimes, social biases and assumptions are implicit in 
the development of the law itself. This was particularly prominent during the 
discussion about defining and managing gendered crimes. In other situations, though 
the law has been developed through conscientious and painstaking emphasis on 
remedying the subjugation of a marginalised group (i.e. women), unquestioning 
acceptance of the social group‟s oppressed state and overall powerlessness 
sometimes impedes the inclusion of the group in decision-making that may directly 
(or indirectly) affect its members.  This issue has been particularly relevant to the 
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incorporation (or lack thereof) of women into post-conflict peace processes. 
Recognition of women‟s typical role as „victims‟ in violence, helpless and apolitical, 
has led to them being completely marginalised from initiatives aimed at preventing 
future conflict. This has occurred despite the many legal declarations and 
conventions advocating and promoting women‟s participation in all aspects of public 
life. However, despite the numerous examples of women‟s capacity for brutality, this 
emphasis on „involving women‟ seldom appears to extend to negotiations relating to 
the cessation of violence.   
The law has also played a significant role in endeavours to thwart future 
expressions of political violence. In this case, recognition of women‟s capacity for 
violence, has led security experts and institutions to vilify all women, and to 
manipulate the law in order to justify its decision to do so. Gender stereotypes that 
have consistently proclaimed that women are naturally inclined towards 
peacefulness, tolerance and compassion have immense influence over how the 
international system constructs various expressions of women‟s violence. Cast as 
atypical and aberrant, these examples of violent behaviour are depicted as all the 
more alarming and menacing.  As such, the implementation of State policies that 
illustrate a flagrant disregard for women‟s human rights are explained as being 
justified in the face of this „new threat‟. 
 
7. Drawing Conclusions and Making Connections 
This article set out to substantiate three primary claims. First, gender 
stereotypes shape the way we understand women‟s political violence. Second, the 
gendering of violence (differentiating between men and women‟s violence) results in 
an interpretation of women‟s brutality that presents women as victims, rather than 
agents, of their acts of violence. Third, these theoretical impressions of women‟s 
violent conduct affect how the international system legally and practically manages 
expressions of women‟s political violence, much of which erects a whole set of 
human rights challenges for the protection of both violent women, and other actors in 
global politics.  
 Countless articles, media reports, academic accounts and popular literature 
have employed the use of gender stereotypes in order to render women‟s violence 
more comprehensible. Frequently, this shed light on women‟s political violence by 
contrasting it with men‟s more „natural‟ violence, but also construed it in a manner 
that presented it as far more perplexing and inexplicable. Sometimes this was done 
subtly, for instance, by mentioning that a violent woman had men in her life that were 
actively engaged in violent conduct, thereby implying that men may have been partly 
responsible for her resort to violence. Other times the use of gender stereotypes to 
understand women‟s violence occurred in a manner that was far more conspicuous. 
In these instances, women‟s violence was directly compared to men‟s and 
determined to be more „excessive‟ and ruthless. According to these accounts, violent 
women were rendered more puzzling specifically because they engaged in behaviour 
that was not only out of character for women, but did so in a manner that surpassed 
the brutality of men - who are frequently perceived as the more brutal, callous and 
uncompassionate of the two. In both sets of narratives, presenting women‟s violence 
as paradoxical aberrations - those that either defy or revolt against the very essence 
of femininity – these narratives portrayed violent women as merciless, soulless, and 
absolutely corrupted individuals. 
Despite these very ominous characterisations of women‟s violence, the 
women protagonists in the narratives that materialise are seldom considered wilful 
administrators of their own acts of brutality.  Imputing their violent behaviour to 
culture, patriarchy, society and pathology, these reports and articles cast doubt on 
women‟s capacity for engaging in violence voluntarily and intentionally.  In essence, 
brutal women were construed as powerless and unthinking victims. As a result, these 
women became less culpable and responsible than would be expected in 
comparable situations that featured men as the primary agents of violence. Women‟s 
victim-identity became thoroughly entrenched in the overall perception of women - a 
stereotype that that attached itself to all women generally. Even in the absence of a 
verifiable contravention of norms, women‟s brutality continued to be interpreted in a 
manner that assumed a priori victimhood. As such, breaches were regularly 
manufactured (e.g. psychological abnormalities) in order to validate women‟s 
victimisation rather than to establish it.  
Remarkably, the only time it seems that we have a tendency to doubt women‟s 
victimhood is when an instance is identified in which the primacy of women‟s victim-
identity needs to be subverted in order to make room for men „victims‟. This has 
become apparent in recent attempts to put the spotlight on men‟s experiences of 
sexual violence, in the process of which some academics counter-argue that 
women‟s political violence has historically shown many signs of being completely 
consensual and not at all coerced.146 Reinforcing the absolute nature of the common 
„victim/perpetrator‟ model of political violence, this claim sustains the idea that 
individuals can be either solely the victims of violence or its perpetrators, but never 
both. While achieving greater recognition of men‟s experiences of wartime sexual 
violence and their status as bona fide victims, these declarations imply that we need 
to somehow undermine the victimhood of women in order to recognise the 
victimhood of men. 
 The gendering of violence did not only confine itself to how we perceived 
women‟s political violence, but how we managed and responded to expressions of 
such violence as well. Since law presents the most oft pursued method of violence 
management (because in most societies it is usually perceived as the most 
legitimate, authoritative and impartial), this article considered both the legal and 
political channels employed by the international community in response to women‟s 
involvement in genocidal violence and terrorism. Particular attention was devoted to 
verifying the human rights challenges that arose from the ways in which the 
international system managed such examples of political violence. In particular, it 
was revealed that, at least in the areas of international criminal justice, international 
peace and reconciliation, and international security, the gendering of violence had a 
tremendous influence over the protection of the rights of men and women, 
perpetrators and victims, and those occupying a space in-between these very unitary 
categorisations.  
This article has, at its heart, endeavoured to invoke three important 
realisations in relation to political violence. Perhaps, most significant, is that it aimed 
to bring to the forefront the recognition that gender biases, stereotypes and gender 
identities, though socially-constructed, are very powerful and influential components 
of our overall perceptions of violence and victimhood. Second, it has hopefully 
sparked a renewed interest in investigating how the law interprets and defends these 
examples of political violence – in particular looking at gender-neutrality in the areas 
international criminal justice and the punishment of international crimes. Last, and 
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perhaps most meaningful, this article was primarily prompted by the desire to 
cultivate an understanding of political violence that transverses gender boundaries. It 
is anticipated that the article will spark interest in looking at instances of political 
violence in a manner uninhibited by the perpetrator‟s gender. Furthermore, it is 
hoped that the international system not only realises that women can be, and are, 
perpetrators of violence, but that that it also interprets and responds to their 
expressions of violence using approaches that do not presume, right at the outset, 
that violent women are either unnatural and abnormal, or victims of circumstances 
beyond their control. It is expected that, if anything, the article motivates the 
international community to finally view women‟s participation in violence in a similar 
vein to men‟s involvement in violence – as an autonomous choice clearly indicative of 
the human capacity for violence.  
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